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ABSTRACT

Cogdill, Mindi Hope. M.S., Purdue University, December 2015. Evidence for a
Mnemonic Benefit of Animate-Object Interaction: Enhanced Retention From Animate
Contact. Major Professor: James S. Nairne.

The importance of animacy has been discovered in the perception literature, the
neuroscience literature, and most recently in the memory literature. However, little is
known about the extent to which we track the things that agents come into contact with
in the environment, and its implications for human memory. Our memory system has
been shaped by natural selection to assist in our ability to survive long enough to
reproduce our genes. One of the major evolutionary influences on our survival would
have been our ability to track, monitor, and predict the behavior of other agents
because an agent can be a predator, potential food, potential mate (as described by the
animate-monitoring hypothesis; New, Cosmides, & Tooby, 2007), and even a source
for contamination as stated by the law of contagion (Rozin, Millman, & Nemeroff,
1986). Across three recall experiments, I examined if the human memory system was
structured to prioritize objects that were touched by agents.
Experiment 1 tested the incidental memory for objects that were acted upon by
agents and other inanimate objects. Participants read sentences that described living
and nonliving things interacting with an object, and then were asked to imagine each
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scene and make an imagery rating. Participants were significantly better at
remembering objects that were associated with the agents relative to inanimates.
Experiment 2 investigated whether there would be mnemonic benefit for
remembering the objects that were interacted with by an agent relative to a nonliving
thing if participants were provided with the actors of the action (agent and inanimate)
as a cue on a surprise recall test. Participants again created mental images and provided
ratings. There was a significant improvement in memory for the target objects that
were associated with a living thing compared to a nonliving thing.
Experiment 3 examined whether the memory benefit for objects that were
touched by agents could be due to the more vivid mental images participants were
creating for the agentic sentences as compared to the inanimate sentences. All the
sentences were changed to have the exact same action that was performed by the living
and nonliving actor. On a surprise cued-recall test where the participants were given
the actor and verb as a cue, memory performance for the target objects was superior if
that object was touched by an animate relative to an inanimate.
The consistent results across all three experiments support the idea that the
human memory system is organized to track and remember the objects that living
things interact with and physically touch. The mechanisms that allow for the mnemonic
benefit are not yet understood, but it may be because there is an awareness (perhaps
unconsciously) that living things are salient creatures in our environment that carry
sickness, germs, and diseases. It is also possible that humans unknowingly track the
objects that are owned or touched by agents because there is the common belief that
characteristics of the agent get transferred to the object, which is referred to as the law
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of contagion. Whether the reason for the enhanced memory is because both of these
work in conjunction or context facilitates one over the other, the benefit is clear.

1

INTRODUCTION

A method to construct an understanding of how our memory system is designed
to operate is to take a functional approach and “forward engineer” hypotheses as
termed by Nairne (2015). Unquestionably, natural selection shaped our cognitive
systems to enhance our ability to live long enough by noticing, avoiding, and/or
escaping predators in order to reproduce our genes. This ability was no easy feat, and
our understanding of the selection pressures that built our system is being advanced
every day. However, we are still on the cusp of explaining the function and purpose of
our memory system, and this requires generating hypotheses about selection pressures
that may have been present in our ancestral past.
In order to examine this question, one must consider the specific problems in
our environment that we needed to solve. Indeed, this is an empirical question and has
been examined. Processing information for its survival relevance, contamination, and
animacy has been shown to produce a memory advantage (see Nairne, 2015 for a
review). A notable selection pressure would have been our ability to monitor and
remember the behaviors of other living things, especially other humans. Humans and
nonhuman animals (agents) would have been a categorical priority relative to nonliving
things: humans for their potential to be a friend (e.g., an in-group member or a mating
partner) or a foe (e.g., an out-group member, a cheater, a dangerous rival), and
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nonhuman animals for their potential to be food (e.g., wild game), a shelter or tool
(e.g., animal hide, bone), or a survival threat (Nairne & Panderiada, 2010; Orians &
Heerwagen, 1992).
There is a need to clarify the use of the terms agent and animate. Though these
two concepts may be distinctly represented in the brain (Johnson, 2003; Lillard, Zeljo,
Curenton, & Kaugars, 2000; Lou, Kaufman, & Baillargeon, 2009; Mandler, 1992;
Okita & Schwartz, 2006), the neural distinction is the representation and perception of
self-initiated movement in combination with goal-orientated movement. The prior two
types of movement are classified as an agent in human studies. A description provided
by Gobbini et al. (2011) explains the difference, “Animate entities are living things that
can act as agents. Living things that are not sentient and do not act as agents are not
animate” (p. 1911). He later states that agents are entities that generate their own
movements in order to achieve goals. In this domain, animates refer to living beings
such as humans and nonhuman animals, and does not include living things such as
plants. For the purpose of this study, both terms will be used interchangeably, because
the materials used in the experiment are animals (both animate and agentic) and objects
(inanimate and not an agent).
Combining agentic selection pressures with the functionalist reasoning for
memory design, one can then hypothesize that memory would have been tuned for
agents in our environment (Cosmides & Tooby, 1992; Nairne, VanArsdall, Pandeirada,
Cogdill, & LeBreton, 2013). Agents would have been of critical importance in our
ancestral environment, and therefore, it would be reasonable to assume that our
memory system is biased to remember agents relative to nonliving things. Recently,
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empirical evidence has been presented in support of this mnemonic advantage (Bonin,
Gelin, & Bugaiska, 2014; Nairne et al, 2013; VanArsdall, Nairne, Pandeirada, & Blunt,
2013; VanArsdall, Nairne, Pandeirada, & Cogdill, 2015). However, little is yet known
about the extent to which our memory is tuned for the behavior of agents since this is a
recent discovery in the literature. Additionally, limited work has focused on the
theoretical framing to extend our predictions for mnemonic priorities in human
memory.
An evolutionary approach in the cognition literature has gained insight to the
relevance of animacy as a dimension that shaped our ancestral brains. From prioritizing
agents in our visual attention, tracking their behavior with things they own or touch,
and automatically imparting properties that were transferred onto those objects, these
operations have undoubtedly shaped our cognitive architecture. Therefore, I suggest
our ability to remember objects that came into physical contact with other agents would
have been an adaptive trait that arguably developed from contagion avoidance (Rozin
& Nemeroff, 2002).
In order to advance our knowledge for how our memory system is designed to
monitor and remember things connected to agents, I propose to examine if there is a
mnemonic component for the objects that are touched by agents relative to the objects
that come into contact with each other. The ability to remember an artifact that an agent
handled would have been adaptive for a few reasons. Preceding the identification of the
objects, one must first identify the agent. Agents include human and nonhuman
animals. It would be adaptive to assess that agents have intentions for their behavior
based on internal goals. Our ability to attribute a mental state to other agents allowed
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us to understand and predict their actions. This would have enabled us to avoid
predators, catch prey, selectively mate, and attribute characteristics. Accordingly, the
interactions between two agents or an agent and an object are relevant to the internal
goals of the agent.
Moreover, the physical contact between the agent and the object should be an
important indicator for tracking ownership and property. Across cultures and in the lab,
it has been observed that personal objects of agents are reported to contain an
“essence” of the owner (see Rozin & Nemeroff, 2002, for a review). The essence
transfer is a form of magical thinking called sympathetic magic. Specifically, it is
called the law of psychological contamination (Frazer, 1895; Mauss, 1902). This
implies that objects may be more than they appear because of the history of the artifact.
In addition to psychological transfer of essence from agent to object, there is also the
concept of contamination (or transfer of disease). Intrapersonal contact, which is
primarily person (as opposed to a nonhuman animal) to object, then the object to
another person is one typical way how illnesses spread. Sickly pathogens are also
commonly spread from food that comes from living animals because meat tends to
contain microbial bacteria that is not found in plants.
I am proposing a hypothesis based on a functional interpretation of our memory
system: If our memory system is designed to solve specific problems directly related to
fitness, then in addition to remembering the agents themselves, we should have also
have a special tuning for the objects that are touched by agents. I argue the locus of the
mnemonic advantage, if there is one, is rooted in the physical contact itself between the
agent and the object. My hypothesis would predict a mnemonic advantage for the
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objects physically touched by agents relative to objects that physically touch each
other. I would not expect a mnemonic advantage for the interacting objects because
objects do not have ownership of other objects, and they are less likely to be the source
of microbial contamination.
The Animate-Monitoring Hypothesis
Numerous attention paradigms have been employed to study animacy, and the
findings are consistent: humans are able to detect agents in the environment quickly
and accurately. This attentional bias is called the animate-monitoring hypothesis (New,
Cosmides, & Tooby, 2007). This hypothesis assumes that agents change their status in
the environment quicker and more frequently than non-agents like plants, objects, and
natural formations. Because agents have active minds and are mobile, the constant
monitoring and updating of their status would be critically needed by our attention
system. Therefore, we required a visual processing mechanism that worked
automatically to attribute attentional resources to animates relative to inanimates. To
test this hypothesis, New et al. (2007) gave participants a change-detection task and
asked them to detect a single change between two natural scenes across many different
categories: human, nonhuman animals, plants, objects, tools, and vehicles. Participants
were only given 250 ms to view the initial scene. The initial scene was followed by a
250 ms mask then lastly another 250 ms for participants to view the paired (changed)
scene and make the comparison judgment. The authors found that participants were
able to detect the changes quicker and more reliably when those changes involved an
agent (human or nonhuman animal) as compared to the other categories such as
vehicles, even though people have more experience detecting vehicles in everyday life.
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The remarkable speed of agent detection was later supported using a saccadic choice
task. This paradigm was used to eliminate the possibility that participants were
evaluating the changed scene for its global statistics, and not noticing the absence of
the agent per se. However, it was revealed that agents were detected preceding the
categorization of the scene (Crouzet, Joubert, Thorpe, & Fabre-Thorpe, 2012),
suggesting that rapid animal detection might be due to a mechanism that selects
specific features special to agents.
Further support for the animate-monitoring hypothesis has been found in
inattentional blindness paradigms (Calvillo & Jackson, 2014; New & German, 2015),
eye-tracking (Yang et al., 2012), visual searches (Jackson & Calvillo, 2013), and under
high-perceptual load (Calvillo & Jackson, 2014; Jackson & Calvillo, 2013). During an
inattentional blindness task, participants were actively engaged in attending to the
visual scene, yet failed to notice when something had been added to the scene that did
not typically belong considering the context. In a typical inattentional blindness task,
the attention of the participant is directed elsewhere to complete a task, and they are not
explicitly told something in the scene will change. The change-detection task, on the
other hand, explicitly instructs participants in advance to seek out the change that had
occurred between scenes. Calvillo and Jackson (2014) tested the susceptibility to
inattentional blindness with animates or inanimates as the target of the change.
Participants were shown a circular area of white space on the screen with a centered
fixation cross for 1 second. Next, an array of words (four for the low-cognitive load
condition, six for high-cognitive load) appeared along the circumference of the viewing
area for 1 second, then immediately followed by a mask. The critical manipulation
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occurred on the last trial in a set of three trials. On the fourth screen, the fixation cross
was replaced with a picture of an animate (e.g., horse, baby) or inanimate thing (e.g.,
scissors, hammer). Participants were instructed to write down the word in the array that
represented a color. They were not informed of the change to the fixation cross in the
center of the screen. At the end of the experiment, participants were asked if they
noticed anything other than the words that was not present in the previous trials.
Consistent with the animate-monitoring hypothesis, participants were able to detect the
change more frequently when the fixation cross changed to a living thing relative to an
inanimate object.
Most recently, New and German (2015) tested inattentional blindness for an
evolutionary-threatening stimulus (a spider) relative to a modern threatening stimulus
(hypodermic needle) and a nonthreatening stimulus (housefly). Participants were
instructed to judge the relative length of two lines that were presented in the center of
the screen. On the fourth judgment trial, one of the three types of stimulus appeared in
one of four quadrants along with the line segments. Immediately following this critical
trial, participants were asked if they saw anything in addition to the cross on the screen.
If they indicated they noticed the change, they were asked to identify the location and
the stimulus. Before the last expected judgment trial, participants were informed to
ignore the judgment task and only pay attention to the display. On this last trial, one of
the three types of stimulus appeared on the screen. Participants were asked the same
questions from the critical fourth trial. In two experiments with varying stimuli that
included scrambled and abstract representations, New and German (2015) found that
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participants were better able to detect and identify a spider (evolutionary threat) as
compared to a hypodermic needle (modern threat) and a housefly (no threat).
By tracking the eye movements of participants when engaged in visualizing
pictures of animates and inanimates, Yang et al. (2012) found that while equating
valence, arousal, and other low-level visual features, animates were attended to for
longer periods of time and visually preferred than inanimate objects. In a visual search
task, Jackson and Calvillo (2013) found that participants processed and located animate
things faster than inanimate things. Animates were least impacted by high perceptual
load while inanimate detection was most slowed by perceptual load (Calvillo &
Jackson, 2014; Jackson & Calvillo, 2013).
Gelman (1990) pointed out the importance of causal principles when processing
information directly related to the animate and inanimate relationship. She reasoned
that animates are causal forces for self-generated movement but inanimates are not.
Only an outside or external force can cause the movement of an inanimate object. In
contrast, the reason for animate movement is purposeful and in direct response to the
environment. When an animate changes its status by changing its location, it is intrinsic
movement, but when an inanimate changes its status, it is an extrinsic cause. Moreover,
in five experiments, Cohn and Paczynksi (2003) found that the capacity to predict a
future event was facilitated by an agent serving as the critical causal role in the event
relative to an animate recipient of an action.
Property Tracking of Agents
There have been numerous studies evaluating how objects that were once
owned or touched by other people change in estimated value. Most recently, Newman
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and Bloom (2014) had participants make bids on particular objects that were advertised
as for sale from celebrity auctions. The authors found that the estimated amount of
money that one would pay to own the objects for sale were directly related to the
amount of physical contact assumed and the remaining “essence” left in the object.
This finding was consistent with previous work that showed the greater the amount of
inferred physical contact, the more money participants would be willing to pay (Lee,
Linkenauger, Bakdash, Joy-Gaba, & Profitt, 2011; Newman & Dahr, 2014; Newman,
Diesendruck, & Bloom, 2011; Rozin, Nemeroff, Wane, & Sherrod, 1989).
Additionally, the amount of money willing to be paid decreased if the objects were to
be sterilized first, but much less of a decrease if the objects were to be moved to a new
location before being sold. As noted by Rozin et al. (1989), the history associated with
an object directly affected the perceived value of that object. An interesting study by
Newman, Diesendruck, and Bloom (2011) found that the concept of contagion was the
primary influence that drove the willingness to pay for an object. They independently
manipulated the market demand, the association, or the psychological contamination of
an object to a celebrity (liked and disliked), and found the degree of physical contact
directly affected the valuation of the object independent from the association or the
market demand. The concept of an “essence” transfer was offered as an explanation for
the increased estimated value of the object.
Secondly, recent work by DeScioli, Rosa, and Gutchess (2015) examined how
memory was influenced by explicitly manipulating the association between an agent
and an object. In three experiments, DeScioli et al. (2015) found that memory was
enhanced for the object that was paired with an animate when the association was by
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ownership, purposeful wanting, and thinking of the object relative to accidentally
bumping into the object or the unrelated control. This study showed that intrinsic
desires or ownership of an item lead to better memory for those items.
Gelman, Noles, and Stilwell (2014) tested memory for the association between
a person and an object. They wanted to explore possession tracking with children and
adults (as a control) for two relevant reasons. First, object tracking would allow one to
monitor the history of the object. This would include information relevant for who or
what has been in contact with it, and where it has been. This process would be directly
related to the law of the contagion. Rozin and Nemeroff (1990) showed the strength of
the perceptual influence of essence transfer when two things come into physical contact
with each other. They showed that prior ownership of an object can have causal
consequences, and people behave as if their interpretation of the object is the reality—
as in a sweater previously worn by Hitler still carries an essence of evil. Secondly,
children have shown the propensity to remember and mimic the actions performed by
adults when they manipulate new objects. Gelman et al. (2014) theorized that if there
was an attentional bias to track the actions of agents, in addition to a tendency to track
the objects they possess, then children should show specialized attention and memory
for objects owned by agents. By the end of two experiments, Gelman et al. (2014)
discovered that children as well as adults showed a memory advantage for objects
owned by agents (in this case, themselves) compared to learning the novel label of the
objects (i.e., Sarn, Koba, and Manu) and preference (i.e., “Which one do you like
best?”). The results of this study were an important contrast to previous work with
toddlers that found children tend to devote their attention to the perceptual features of
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objects relative to the object history. Therefore, Gelman et al. (2014) suggested that
tracking the contact or ownership history of an object is a basic human disposition.
Sympathetic Magic: The Law of Contagion
Agents and the properties they carry play a critical role in shaping our mental
architecture, and this impact can be detected by examining the behavioral role of
magical thinking. Sympathetic magic was introduced by Sir James Frazer
(1890/1922/1959) and Marcel Mauss (1902/1972) who described the details of
ritualistic supernatural behavior across the cultures of the world. Two universal laws
were characterized: the law of similarity and the law of psychological contamination,
or the law of contagion as it is now referred. The law of similarity states that when two
or more things physically resemble each other, they are interpreted as sharing basic
properties. The law of contagion states that when two or more things come into
physical contact with each other, there is a perception of permanent transmission or
transference of properties between the items. Taken together, these two laws explain
how people behave as if their interpretation of the physical world is the perceived
reality (Rozin & Nemeroff, 2002).
The law of contagion dictates “once in contact, always in contact”, and
typically describes a permanent transfer of an “essence” from one thing (the source)
that is typically animate in nature to another thing (the target) that is typically
inanimate in nature, but can be animate (Rozin & Nemeroff, 2002). Here, I will only
focus on the importance of the law of contagion since it provides a complementary
interpretation for why we would monitor, track, and remember objects that are touched
by agents. Our ability to protect ourselves from potential contaminates, like unseen
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pathogens or visible signs of polluted food, could have been modulated by disgust.
Rozin and Nemeroff (2002) argued that what started out as a disgust domain to prevent
our ancestors from ingesting contaminated food could have since been exapted to
imbue physical and characteristic properties from physical contact. The operative
behavior regarding the law of contagion has also shown to be asymmetrical in valence,
repeatedly exhibiting stronger behavioral effects for negative attributes relative to
positive ones (Nemeroff & Rozin, 1994; Nemeroff, Brinkman, & Woodward, 1994;
Rozin & Royzman, 2001; Rozin, Markwith, & Nemeroff, 1992; Rozin, Millman, &
Nemeroff, 1986).
In effect, the law of contagion plays two roles for the hypothesis presented in
this study. First, the permanent nature of the property transmission from one object to
another would have helped us track and therefore remember certain qualities of a given
object. Second, the transfer of physical properties (like germs, diseases, etc.) along
with characteristic properties (the “essence”) can only be done via actual physical
contact. These two assumptions in conjunction would have facilitated our behavior and
beliefs surrounding human and nonhuman interactions with other things (whether
animate or inanimate).
Memory for Animates
There is now evidence for the direct mnemonic benefit of processing
information for animates. A mnemonic preference for recalling animate words relative
to inanimate words has been found for both incidental and intentional learning
paradigms (Bonin, Gelin, & Bugaiska, 2014; Nairne, VanArsdall, Pandeirada, Cogdill,
& LeBreton, 2013; VanArsdall, Nairne, Pandeirada, & Blunt, 2013). Firstly, Nairne et
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al. (2013) evaluated the recallability norms published by Rubin and Friendly (1986) for
the previously uncoded dimension of animacy. Using a regression analysis, the authors
found that if a word was animate, it was one of the highest predictors for subsequent
recall. Secondly, to test memory for animate and inanimate words directly, items were
selected and matched across 10 dimensions, and participants were asked to learn the
words across three study trials. Overall, participants were able to recall more animate
than inanimate words consistently across all three free recall trials.
Following this finding, VanArsdall et al. (2013) tested the hypothesis that
animates should be better remembered than inanimates because of animate processing
and not due to any prior knowledge or associations attributed to the items being
learned. Ideally, this required participants to view nonwords. Across two experiments,
participants rated each word for its degree of animacy represented by a short
description provided with each word on the screen. For example: “FRAV has a round
shape” (p.172). After a short delay, participants in the first experiment then performed
an old-new recognition task, and participants in the second experiment performed a
free recall task. Results revealed a consistent animacy advantage in recognition and
recall as compared to inanimate words. The tendency to remember animates above and
beyond inamates has since been replicated by Bonin et al. (2014) with processing
picture stimuli. Importantly in the fourth experiment, the authors showed the
mnemonic benefit for animate words was not because of differences in the richness of
encoding from the perceptual or semantic features. The question still remains what
kind of spontaneous encoding occurs when processing animate words that would lead
to enhanced retention.
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Most recently, VanArsdall and et al. (2015) reported an animacy effect in a
paired-associate learning paradigm. In two experiments, the memory benefit for
animacy processing was tested using Swahili (foreign language) and English word
pairs. An English word that was randomly paired with a Swahili word was represented
as the fictional definition. Half of the English definitions were animate and the other
half inanimate. Considering the potential difficulty of learning the English-Swahili
word pairs, three learning trials were conducted in both experiments. As predicted,
recall was consistently better for the animate “definitions” relative to the inanimate
ones across all trials.
In a related set of studies using paired-associate learning, memory was
investigated for animate and inanimate pairs of words in an interactive imagery task.
Wilton and Mathieson (1996) had participants read animate pairs of words that were
embedded in a sentence then later tested with a surprise recall test. The sentences
presented either used action verbs or a conjunction that linked the two critical words to
be remembered. In both studies, participants were asked to form a mental image of the
sentence for 12 seconds. The sentences using action verbs to describe the interaction
between two living things (e.g., “A gorilla threatening an ostrich”) produced better
retention for the target word than the conjunction sentences (e.g., “The lizard and the
whale”). In a follow-up study, Wilton (2006) used animal and object pairs but with an
intentional learning design. The sentence syntax was similar to the sentences used in
Wilton and Mathieson (1996)—the cue and target words were linked by an action verb
or a conjunction. Participants were asked to create a mental image of the sentence read
by the experimenter. A recognition test showed better accuracy for the action sentences
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(e.g., “A chimpanzee sitting on an orange kettle”) compared to the non-interacting
sentences (e.g., “A rabbit and a pink book”). Together, the Wilton and Mathieson
(1996) and Wilton (2006) studies showed a memory benefit for the targets of a cuetarget pair using interactive imagery. However, the retention benefit for living targets
compared to nonliving targets was not examined. In contrast Popp and Serra (2015)
recently argued that memory was actually impaired for learning pairs of words in
which one word was an animate. Across two experiments in a standard paired-associate
task, participants learned animate-animate, animate-object, object-animate, or objectobject word pairs. Recall for the target word was worse in both experiments for the
animate-animate word pairs (Experiment 1 and 3) compared to the object word pairs.
Introduction to the Experiments
In three experiments, I aimed to explore if there was a memory benefit for the
inanimate objects that were manipulated by agents. Empirical data has shown there is
an attentional bias for agents relative to non-agents, that we attribute internal goals,
track their actions, and have greater memory for them. In this study, tracking an agent
would include anything that it touched so we could later remember whether to avoid it
to prevent contamination, to preserve it because of the special characteristics it may
contain, or to allow the prediction of the agent’s behavior.
Memory effects for animate and inanimate interactions have been previously
done in the paired-associate learning paradigms with interactive imagery; however, to
my knowledge no one has looked at recall of the target pair differentially between the
living and nonliving actors (the one responsible for the action). On the other hand,
there have been studies that found greater memory for objects that were labeled as

16
“owned” by an agent compared to a preference choice, a novel label (Gelman et al.,
2014), bumped into by an agent, or described as unrelated to an agent (DeScioli et al.,
2015).
Since the goal of this study was to investigate the memory influence from an
interaction that occurred between two things, it would be important to ensure the
participants envisioned the interaction in a similar manner for the animate and
inanimate actors. It has been repeatedly established that asking participants to create a
dynamic, interactive mental image enhances memory for those objects relative to a
non-interactive or side-by-side spatial representation (Wilton & Mathieson, 1996;
Wilton, 2006). Therefore, dynamic sentences were created for all three experiments,
and participants were asked to imagine the scene stated on the screen. Experiment 1
was designed to test the memory effect for the target objects on a surprise free recall
test. Experiment 2 tested whether the memory enhancement found in Experiment 1
would persist on a cued-recall test where participants were given the actor and action
originally encoded. The second experiment was also designed to investigate the
accuracy of actor-target pairs. Experiment 3 was intended to control for mental
imagery between the sentences for living and nonliving actors. Participants completed
a similar cued-recall test as done in Experiment 2.
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EXPERIMENT 1

The first study examined whether memory for objects would be influenced by
the source of interactivity: a living agent or a nonliving object interacting with an
object. In the first experiment, participants were presented with sentences that
described a living agent and a nonliving object acting on a target object (displayed as a
line drawing). Participants were not informed of the upcoming memory test, but were
instructed to create a mental image of the event described in each sentence and to give
a mental imagery rating after each sentence.
I predicted that following a short delay, participants should have better recall
performance for the objects that were interacted with by agents as compared to other
inanimate objects. In the surprise recall task, they were prompted to try and recall as
many of the pictures previously presented with the sentences. The pictures represented
the object that was the recipient of the action in each sentence.
Method
Subjects and Design
Sixty-four undergraduates (34 females and 30 males) from Purdue University
volunteered in exchange for partial credit in an introductory psychology course. Actor
type (animate or inanimate) was manipulated as a within-subject variable. Vividness
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ratings for mental imagery and proportion of objects correctly recalled were the
dependent variables.
Materials
Sentences were created with careful consideration for the actor in each
sentence. The actor of each sentence (animate and inanimate) was selected from the list
of words compiled in a previous unpublished study by VanArsdall, Nairne, Pandeirada,
and Cogdill (2014). List items were drawn from two tightly-constrained categories (as
opposed to broader categories like “living things” or “objects”) from the Van
Overshchelde, Rawson, and Dunlosky (2004) category norms: ten four-legged animals
(e.g., rabbit and turtle) and ten pieces of furniture (e.g., chair and lamp). These twenty
words were equated as close as possible on eight dimensions including category
typicality, number of letters, frequency, familiarity, concreteness, imageability,
meaningfulness, and number of intralist related semantic associations. See Appendix
Table 1 for the means and statistical comparisons. Ten sentences described a fourlegged animal (animate) performing an action onto an object, and the other ten
described a piece of furniture (inanimate) acting upon an object.
Twenty pictures of objects were chosen from the Snodgrass and Vanderwart
(1980) picture norms to represent the object that would be the recipient of the action in
each sentence. Pictures were selected that were not in the furniture category norms and
had at least a 90% agreement rate for naming the picture (except for word, glasses,
which had a 64% agreement rate due to the other name provided, eye-glasses).
Appendix Figure 4 displays the full set of pictures.
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Twenty sentences were created with ten animate and ten inanimate actors
paired with an object. Each object was displayed as a picture on the screen. The actions
of the actor were selected from action verbs that could apply to both animates and
inanimates allowing for counterbalancing the actor-action-object relationship across
animates and inanimates. A total of ten verbs and verb phrases were used: breaking,
covering, holding up, landing on, pressing against, bending, scraping, knocking over,
falling onto, and destroying. A few examples of the sentences are “The lamp is
destroying the wax candle / The rat is destroying the wax candle; The stool is falling
onto the antique vase / The rabbit is falling onto the antique vase”. A second list of
sentences was created. The actor-object pair was counterbalanced to ensure that each
object was presented with both an animate and an inanimate actor. The counterbalance
was done by replacing the actor from an animate to an inanimate and vice-versa. This
resulted in a pair of lists, List 1 and List 2, as displayed in Appendix Table 2. An
additional presentation order (a second version) was created for each list to counter a
list effect. For example, this meant that for List 1, each sentence was randomly chosen
to a different position in the presentation order, but controlling for the placement to not
include more than two sentences in a row for each condition. The presentation order
was counterbalanced for condition. If List 1 began with an animate sentence, then the
other version of the list began with an inanimate sentence and so forth for the rest of
the list. A total of four lists were used (two versions of each list), but any participant
only studied one list of 20 sentences. Practice sentences were created using a
previously unselected word from each animate and inanimate category and an unused
object.
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Procedure
Participants were brought in the lab to a computer terminal alone or in groups
of up to four people. The instructions were presented by computer, but the recall test
was done with pencil and paper. The experimental session lasted no longer than 30
minutes.
At the beginning of the experiment, participants were instructed to perform the
task according to the design adapted from McDaniel and Einstein (1986). Instructions
asked the participants to focus on the mental imagery task during encoding.

In the first task, you will see a series of sentences presented one at a time
on the computer screen. Below each sentence there will be a picture of
an object. Reach each sentence and try to form a mental image of the
event described by each sentence. The picture is to help you form your
mental image of the event occurring in the sentence. Try to maintain the
image for the entire time the sentence appears on the screen. Each
sentence will appear for 7 seconds.

Animate and inanimate sentences were randomly intermixed within the session,
but no more than two actors of the same type were presented consecutively. After the
sentence and picture appeared on the screen for 7 seconds, the display changed to
prompt participants to provide a rating for the vividness of their mental image on a
scale from 1 (not a very clear image) to 5 (clear, vivid image). They were given 5
seconds to input their vividness rating. All participants completed a practice trial with
two sentences to read and rate: one animate actor and one inanimate actor.
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Following the encoding task, participants completed a math-based distractor for
approximately two minutes. The final phase was the surprise free recall task.
Participants were asked to freely recall as many of the pictures they previously viewed
in the first phase of the experiment. They were told they would have five minutes to
write down on a sheet of paper as many names of the pictures as they could remember,
and may write them down in any order they wished. The computer displayed a
countdown timer during the recall period. At the end of the experiment, they were
asked to answer two demographic questions inquiring about their gender and native
language.
Results
As predicted the proportion of recall for the target objects was higher for those
that were in contact with an animate versus an inanimate, t(63) = 2.57, p = .01;
Cohen’s d = .32, 95% CI [ .07, .57]. As shown in Figure 1, participants freely recalled
more of the target objects acted upon by living agents (M = .40, SD = .17, SEM = .02)
than nonliving things (M = .34, SD = .16, SEM = .02), even though the exact same
action was performed in each case. The average number of intrusions was also
evaluated. Two kinds of intrusions were possible: words that didn’t appear in the study
sentences (extra-list intrusions) and words that were the actors in the sentences (e.g.,
rabbit, and stool). Overall, intrusions were few, but there were significantly fewer
extra-list intrusions (M = 0.55, SD = 0.94) than actor intrusions (M = 1.28, SD = 1.91),
t(63) = 3.64, p < .001. Interestingly, 67% of the actor intrusions were the previously
presented pieces of furniture, whereas only 33% were the living animals previously
presented.
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Figure 1. Free recall performance for Experiment 1. Error bars represent 95%
confidence intervals.
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The ratings for mental imagery of the animate-actor sentences were more vivid
than the inanimate-actor sentences, t(63) = 5.83, p < .001. An animal interacting with
an object was rated as more vivid (M = 3.52, SD = 0.74, SEM = 0.09) than the furniture
interacting with another object (M = 3.00, SD = 0.62, SEM = 0.08) even though, again,
exactly the same target object and action verb were involved in each case (across
participants).
Discussion
The first experiment supported my prediction that if a living agent interacted
with an object, the memory for the object would be influenced. Specifically, incidental
encoding of a living agent interacting with an object resulted in better memory for the
object. The results of Experiment 1 complemented the findings from Gelman et al.
(2014) and DeScioli et al. (2015). Memory was enhanced for the target objects without
a reference to ownership between the actor and object. Moreover, the animatemonitoring hypothesis predicted this result. Though the effects via physical contact has
been investigated in terms of estimated value, desire of ownership, affect, and
willingness to consume or purchase, the effect of animate interaction on memory has
also not been investigated until now. The law of contagion, as manipulated by physical
contact in previous studies, would have also predicted this pattern of results because it
would be important to trace the source of the contact for subsequent decision-making.
However, several interpretive problems remain. It would be reasonable to argue
that the mnemonic benefit in recall could partly be due to the greater accessibility of
the agent actors relative to the nonliving actors, which then facilitated the recall of the
paired object. This argument would also be supported by the difference in vividness
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ratings between the living and nonliving sentences. According to previous work in the
interactive imagery literature by Wilton and Mathieson (1996) and Wilton (2006), I
would not necessarily expect an imagery rating difference between the living and
nonliving sentences. The Wilton studies did not find significant imagery differences
between animals that interacted with each other or animals that interacted with objects
compared to non-interacting imagery. However, the interactive imagery ratings have
not been looked at independently for living and nonliving actions. Therefore,
Experiment 2 was designed to correct the concern of unmatched accessibility between
the living and nonliving sentences.
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EXPERIMENT 2

The purpose of the second experiment was to eliminate the possibility of
differential access to the actors of the sentences during the recall task. In doing so,
recall for Experiment 2 was a cued-recall test. The participants were given all the
actors and actions of the sentences previously encoded and were asked to recall the
object that had been acted upon by each given actor. This change made the recall task
more similar to paired-associate learning. This was desirable because the contagion
hypothesis assumes the participant remembers the source (the actor) of the physical
interaction as well as the recipient (the object), and it is this relationship that increases
or decreases the value of an object (Newman & Bloom, 2014). A cued-recall test
required the participants to remember the original pairing of the actor and object.
Apart from the recall task, the rest of the experimental design was the same as
Experiment 1. The sentences provided to the participants were the same as presented
previously. Similarly, everyone was asked to rate the vividness of their mental images
after each sentence.
First, I predicted a boost in recall performance for both conditions compared to
the first experiment because of the change from a free to cued-recall test. Second, I
predicted a replication of the results from Experiment 1. There should be better recall
accuracy for objects that interacted with agents relative to inanimate objects.
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Additionally, because the actors would be provided to the participants at test, I
predicted fewer extra-list intrusions than the first experiment and near zero actor
intrusions. No changes were made to the sentences or the rating task; therefore, I
predicted the imagery ratings to be similar to the ones reported in Experiment 1.
Method
Subjects and Design
Sixty-four undergraduates (24 female and 40 male) from an introductory
psychology course participated in exchange for course credit. None of the students
from Experiment 1 were used for Experiment 2. A simple design was used with actor
type (animate or inanimate) manipulated within-subjects. Imagery ratings and
proportion of objects correctly recalled were collected.
Materials
All the sentences used for Experiment 1 were used for Experiment 2 in the
same counterbalancing conditions using two primary lists (four study lists in total).
Procedure
The same encoding and distractor methods from Experiment 1 were used for
Experiment 2. Each participant was provided with the same instructions and distractor
task as the first experiment. Each participant read 20 sentences in total; half of the
sentences described an animate interacting with an object, and the remaining half
described an inanimate interacting with an object. All participants completed a practice
trial with two untested sentences. Following each sentence, participants rated their
mental imagery and then completed a math-based distractor task for approximately two
minutes. The final task was the surprise cued-recall test. The recall paper had the
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sentences previously presented but randomly re-ordered with a blank at the end of the
sentence where the recipient object was presented (remember, this was also represented
as a picture during the encoding phase). For example, an inanimate cue would be “The
lamp is destroying the __________”, and the animate cue would be “The rat is
breaking the __________”. All participants received the same recall sheet with the
cues in the exact same order. They were given 5 minutes to complete as many
sentences as possible. After the recall test, they were asked but not required to answer
two demographic questions inquiring about gender and native language.
Results
Figure 2 shows the overall level of performance was higher than in Experiment
1. As predicted, the proportion of recalled objects was significantly greater if interacted
with by an animate relative to an inanimate, t(63) = 4.03, p < .001; Cohen’s d = .50,
95% CI [.24, .76]. This meant participants correctly remembered more of the agent
actor-object pairs (M = .64, SD = .23, SEM = .03) than the inanimate actor-object pairs
(M = .54, SD = .21, SEM = .03). There were few extra-list intrusions (M = 0.81, SD =
1.39), which was expected considering they were presented with the partial sentences.
The type of target intrusion was analyzed. These were target objects that were recalled,
but paired with the wrong actor source. Target intrusions were examined as whether
they were originally encoded as being in contact with an agent or an inanimate. Target
intrusions were mostly those that were processed as interacting with an inanimate (M =
1.18, SD = 0.90), relative to an animate (M = 0.57, SD = 0.73), t(43) = 3.55, p < .001.
This was an expected result from the recall data. Since participants recalled more of the
target words for the animate actors correctly, this left more of the target words that was
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Figure 2. Cued-recall performance for Experiment 2. Error bars represent 95%
confidence intervals.
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associated with the inanimate actors free to retrieve. Therefore, this particular analysis
of the target intrusions does not offer much insight for the pattern of mistakes made by
the participants.
The mental imagery ratings for the two kinds of sentences were statistically
different. Participants reported clearer mental images for the sentences with an animate
actor (M = 3.66, SD = 0.70, SEM = 0.09) relative to an inanimate actor (M = 3.05, SD =
0.70, SEM = 0.09), t(63) = 8.10, p < .0001.
Discussion
This second experiment supported the results found in Experiment 1 depicting
greater memory for the objects that were interacted with agents as compared to
inanimates. Performance was better overall in this experiment, and that was most likely
due to the change in recall procedure. Though the pattern of results were as predicted,
it was surprising to get a medium-size effect in Experiment 2. The persistence of the
effect was reassuring considering one of the reasons for the change was the concern
about differential access to the actors in the sentences that could be retrieved and serve
as a cue for the target object. Keeping this factor constant across participants and
sentences did not eliminate the effect discovered in the first experiment.
The fewer errors that were made during the recall task for the animate relative
to the inanimate condition was not surprising considering participants accurately
recalled more target objects that were paired with agents. Taking this into account, it
left more target objects that were paired with inanimates freely available for the
participant to retrieve. This would explain the larger proportion of target errors for
objects that were processed as interacting with a nonliving thing.
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The persistent difference in mental imagery between the conditions was
troubling, however. Across both experiments, there were rather large differences in the
clarity ratings between the living and nonliving sentences, meaning the sentences that
depicted a living thing were a more vivid mental picture. This was a problem because it
could be argued that if the participants found it easier to access clear, vivid mental
images during the recall task than less vivid ones, this could explain the pattern of
results in the recall data for both experiments.
Lastly, participants provided feedback at the end of the experiment that
described any difficulties, if any, while creating the mental images. One comment that
was reported 48% of the time was that if the actor and object were largely different in
scale, they experienced difficulty imagining the event described (e.g., “The actions
seemed out of order”, “The actions didn’t make sense because the larger one was
doing something to the smaller one”). The other comment reported by 42% of the
participants was that it was difficult to create a mental image if the actor and object
didn’t normally appear together in everyday life. Experiment 3 was designed to try and
correct as many scale differences as possible between the actor and object. Lastly,
Experiment 3 was designed to use the same action verb for all the living and nonliving
actors because a large proportion of participants reported difficulty creating a mental
image for some of the actions used in the sentences.
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EXPERIMENT 3

According to the law of contagion, physical contact between the actor and the
object is the driving factor for perceived change in the physical properties of the object
(Nemeroff & Rozin, 1994; Newman & Bloom, 2014; Rozin, Millman, & Nemeroff,
1986). To ensure the interactions between the actor and object are physical, the verbs in
Experiment 3 were all changed to “touching”. This action verb was chosen because it
implied direct physical contact, and importantly it should be reasonably simple to
imagine for both living and nonliving actors.
A second change to the stimuli was made because of the feedback from
participants. Some reported it was difficult to create a mental image for the sentences if
there was a difference in physical size between the actor and object. This discrepancy
was corrected by replacing pictures of objects that are small in nature to ones that are
larger and more similar to the sizes of the actors.
The predictions for Experiment 3 were the same as in the second experiment.
Method
Subject and Design
Participants were part of an introduction to psychology course at Purdue
University. Sixty-four people (37 female, 27 male) volunteered in exchange for partial
course credit. Anyone who participated in the previous experiments was not eligible to
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participate in Experiment 3. Actor type (animate or inanimate) was manipulated
within-subjects.
Materials
There were two changes to the sentences used from the previous experiments.
First, all of the action verbs were changed to “touching”, which could be applied to
living and nonliving things. Second, “sofa” was replaced with “shelf” to reduce the
intralist similarity in the inanimate condition caused by “couch” and “sofa”. The
replacement made the intralist relationship more equal to the animate word list. A new
statistical comparison was made between the animate and inanimate items because of
the word change. There was only one marginal difference between the four-legged
animals category and the furniture category items among the eight dimensions. The
animal category contained words that were marginally more concrete (p = .05), but the
two categories did not differ in imageability values. (See Appendix Table 3 for the
means and statistical comparisons). As in the previous experiments, two study lists
were created that counterbalanced each object to be paired with both an animate and an
inanimate actor. Each list was then reordered to counterbalance list effects. Four study
lists were used in this experiment. The two primary lists are displayed in Appendix
Table 4.
The third change to the stimuli was to the pictures (objects that were the
recipients of the action). Approximately half of the pictures were changed to be more
equivalent in physical size to the actors as an attempt to equalize the mental imagery
ratings. The picture stimuli used in Experiment 3 are presented in Appendix Figure 5.
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Procedure
The procedure used in Experiment 2 was used for Experiment 3. Participants
were given a cued-recall test in which the beginning of each sentence served as the cue.
Results
As predicted the results replicated the pattern from Experiment 2. Figure 3
shows that recall performance for target objects was better for those touched by agents
relative to inanimate things, t(63) = 4.77, p < .0001; Cohen’s d = .60, 95% CI [.33,
.86]. The average recall of targets for the agent-actor sentences was .47 (SD = .27, SEM
= .03), and .35 (SD = .26, SEM = .03) for the inanimate-actor sentences,
respectively. There were extremely few extra-list intrusions (M = 0.28, SD = 0.78).
However, there was approximately the same number of target intrusions in this
experiment as compared to Experiment 2. Again, there were fewer errors made for the
target objects that were touched by an agent (M = 0.63, SD = 0.85) as compared to
those touched by an inanimate (M = 1.04, SD = 0.80), t(50) = 2.44, p = .02, but this
was not surprising considering the proportion of recall was greater for the animatetargets.
The mental imagery ratings were more similar between conditions than the
previous experiments. Participants reported almost numerically equal mental image
clarity, however, the difference approached significance, t(63) = 2.06, p = .04. The
average vividness rating for the animates that touched an object was 3.58 (SD = 0.81,
SEM = 0.10), and a slightly lower average for the inanimates that touched an object (M
= 3.40, SD = 0.77, SEM = 0.10).
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Figure 3. Cued-recall performance for Experiment 3. Error bars represent 95%
confidence intervals.
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Discussion
Incidental memory for objects that were touched by animates versus inanimates
was measured with a cued-recall test. Similar to the pattern of results in Experiment 2,
memory was enhanced for objects that came into physical contact with animates
relative to inanimates. Additionally, as desired, the difference in imagery ratings was
more equivalent, though the animate sentences were rated as significantly more vivid
than the inanimate sentences.
Overall, recall performance was lower in this experiment compared to
Experiment 2. This most likely was because all the actions provided were the same,
whereas in the previous experiments, ten unique action verbs were used. The use of
varying actions could allow for participants to more easily discriminate among actors,
however, all verbs were used equally across animate and inanimate sentences for each
participant.
The significant difference between the mental imagery ratings was not ideal.
However, if the ability of the participant to retrieve the target object for each actor was
primarily due to the vividness of the mental image, then I would have expected the
recall results to closely mimic the imagery ratings. This was not the finding. The
memory effect in recall persisted despite the drastic reduction in rating differences. It is
also worth noting that by changing the action verb in this experiment, it raised the
vividness ratings for the inanimate sentences to the average level of the animate
sentences (for both previous experiments).
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GENERAL DISCUSSION

The purpose of this study was to investigate if there was a memory effect for
objects that were touched by living things. Specifically, if an object was touched by a
living thing, would that object be better remembered than if it were touched by a
nonliving thing? Three experiments were designed to test this question. Whether
memory was tested in a free-recall task (Experiment 1) or in cued recall (Experiment 2
and 3), there was a consistent mnemonic benefit for objects touched by animates
relative to inanimates. Importantly, in all three experiments, participants were not
expecting the recall test. Taken together, these three experiments support the idea that
our memory systems may be “tuned” for attributing priority to objects that come into
physical contact with an agent.
I discussed two primary reasons one might expect a memory advantage for
objects that were in physical contact with an agent relative to a nonliving thing. First,
there has been strong evidence suggesting that our cognitive systems are especially
sensitive to animate agents. It is possible that memory is enhanced for agents and
anything they touch simply because processing a scene involving a living thing is
enough to enhance memory, not necessarily because of the physical contact involved.
On the other hand, there are good reasons to suspect that physical contact might be
important. The law of contagion, one of the two laws of sympathetic magic, suggests
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that when two objects come into physical contact, a transfer of “essence” occurs.
Agent-to-object transfer is the most common type of transfer belief recorded in practice
in Western and Eastern cultures (Frazer, 1959; Rozin & Fallon, 1987). There is a
strong behavioral response to the interpretation of a transferred “essence” from the
agent via ownership or by physical contact. Experiment 3 was specifically designed to
make the physical contact between the actor (living or nonliving) and the object clear
to the participants. All the objects were explicitly touched by a living and nonliving
thing, and the results replicated the previous experiments. In conclusion, whether the
mnemonic benefit was from agency, the physical contact, or the combination of both
has yet to be distinguished.
The findings of this study are in contrast to the findings of a recent pairedassociate learning study using animate and inanimate pairs. In two experiments using
animate and object pairs, Popp and Serra (2015) found that the animate-animate pairs
produced the worst performance (Experiment 1 and 3). Their first study had
participants study animal-animal and object-object pairs then gave them a cued-recall
test with the left stimulus word as the cue. Recall accuracy was higher for the objectobject pairs compared to the animal-animal pairs. Their third study had participants
study animal-animal, animal-object, object-animal, and object-object pairs. Again,
object-object performance was significantly better compared to the other three
conditions. It is reasonable to consider that in the Popp and Serra (2015) study,
participants were learning the pairs without any context or use of interactive imagery
that were provided in this study. This could be a reason for the difference in recall,
especially considering the same categorical word pairings were used by Wilton and

38
Mathieson (1996) and Wilton (2006) with an interactive imagery design and showed
cued recall results in contrast to Popp and Serra (2015).
Results from the current study also support the work done by Wilton and
Mathieson (1996) and Wilton (2006) using interactive imagery. Wilton and Mathieson
(1996) used animal-animal pairs in an incidental paired-associate learning design
manipulating interactive imagery. They found in two experiments that recognition of
the target was better for the interactive imagery compared to the control. Wilton (2006)
replicated his results in a cued-recall test using animal-object pairs. Across three
experiments, recall of the target objects was highest when the processing involved the
use of interactive imagery between the animal and object. The results from these two
studies, in combination with the current study provide support that the interaction
between a living and nonliving thing facilitates the memory advantage.
There was a concern regarding the mental image rating difference discovered
in all three experiments. In previous interactive imagery studies that implemented
imagery ratings and used living and nonliving stimuli (as either the stimulus, response,
or both), no rating differences were reported (Wilton, 2006; Wilton & Mathieson,
1996; Winograd & Lynn, 1979). However, there are important differences. First, one
study mixed animate and inanimate pairs for a collapsed rating value (Winograd &
Lynn, 1979). Wilton (2006) used all animate-inanimate pairs, and Wilton and
Mathieson (1996) used all animate-animate pairs. Therefore, imagery ratings have not
been separated between animate-object and inanimate-object pairs.
One could argue that the difference in mental image clarity could have
contributed to the mnemonic benefit for the sentences that had the most vivid image.
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This could have been the case for Experiment 1 and 2. However, the rating differences
for Experiment 3 were numerically closer compared to the previous experiments. The
ratings for the inanimate sentences also increased to the average ratings for the animate
sentences. This would suggest that making the sentences more similar in structure
(same action verb or less dynamic verb) allowed the inanimate actions to be easier to
mentally imagine. Finally, since the recall advantage between the two conditions did
not decrease relative to each other when the imagery ratings nearly equalized, this
would suggest the vividness of the mental images was not the locus of the recall effect.
A second limitation in this study was the unintended inferential differences
between animate and inanimate actors that performed an action. In other words, when a
participant read “The wolf is touching the football”, it was likely that the mental image
included the wolf using a limb or limbs to do the action. For the inanimate sentences
like “The dresser is breaking the plastic drum”, the mental image created would not
include a limb executing the action since a piece of furniture does not have limbs.
Therefore, the actions depicted in the sentences for all three experiments were not
controlled for this factor. This was a limitation recognized after Experiment 2.
However, it was not clear after the first two experiments if the physical contact
between the actor and the object was processed by the participant. Therefore, it was
decided that Experiment 3 should first make the physical contact salient to the
participants to determine if the memory effect would reproduce. Whether or not the
locus of the memory advantage is due to the physical contact or not has yet to be
determined.
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Lastly, another limitation to the present study was the normality of the
interactions. Because of the nature of the stimuli chosen for the actors in the sentences
(animals and furniture), it was impossible to choose objects that both categories of
words would ordinarily interact. The objects that animals touch are typically not the
same objects that pieces of furniture touch. Therefore, it was possible that the
interactions between the animals and objects were more distinctive in nature than the
interactions between the furniture pieces and other objects. It was also possible that this
distinction was independent of the ability for the participants to create a clear, mental
image. All three experiments were conducted with animacy manipulated as a withinsubjects variable. This would mean that if distinctiveness were somehow responsible
for the memory advantage, it would only be detected in a between-subjects
manipulation because distinctiveness effects are eliminated when the participants can
no longer make relative judgments between items. I would predict that if the recall
advantage was mostly because of distinctiveness, there would be no recall difference
between objects touched by animates and inanimates. This would be an important
consideration for a follow-up study.
The three experiments in this study provided some insight for broader learning
implications, specifically for educational purposes. Well-established methods for
enhanced learning of words include retrieval practice, producing a mental image,
processing it for survival, and processing it for animacy. Though the results of this
study are yet unclear for identifying the locus of the mnemonic effect, it is clear a
retention benefit is produced when participants process stimuli for its specific
association to a living thing. There is potential to enhance learning for students by
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instructing them to imagine a living thing (e.g., their friend, sibling, pet, or themselves)
interacting with the stimulus that is to-be-learned. For example, when students in
elementary school are trying to learn new words, this strategy has the potential to
encapsulate their active imaginations while enhancing their learning for the words. This
learning strategy would also be applicable to adults when learning a new language. For
instance, VanArsdall et al. (2015) demonstrated better memory for the (fabricated)
English translation of Swahili words when the Swahili word was processed as
representative of a living thing. The results from VanArsdall et al. (2015) and the
current study suggest learning of educational material can be strengthened if students
generated associations of the material to living things.
In conclusion, the purpose of this study was to further our understanding of
the memory architecture. A functionalist theory for memory design would predict
selective retention for information relevant to enhancing fitness. The selection
pressures for perceptually identifying and attending to living agents relative to other
objects and moving objects in the environment has been repeatedly demonstrated. Only
recently has the animacy dimension been investigated for the effect it has on memory. I
proposed there would be an adaptive value for remembering the objects that were in
contact with a living agent relative to another inanimate object. Whether the object
retained a special “essence” from the living agent that touched it, whether the object
was a source for contamination, or whether the object was better remembered because
it was associated with a living agent could all be adaptive reasons for enhanced
retention of the target object.
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APPENDICES

Inanimate

4.40 (1.17)
16.4 (15.6)
527 (24.1)
616 (17.8)
599 (18.4)
442 (22.9)

Number of Letters
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Familiarity

Concreteness

Imageability

Meaningfulness
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7.62

4.94

0.37
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445 (53.6)

577 (33.1)

600 (23.2)

563 (50.1)

51.8 (64.9)

4.90 (1.29)
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7.32
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-0.18
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Note. Standard deviations are in parentheses. Frequencya = Kučera-Francis written frequency. Category typicality derived from Van Overshchelde, Rawson,

Relatedness
.311 (.098)
.031
.335 (.114)
.036
-0.52
18
.61
________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

.259 (.274)

Category Typicality

Dimension
M
SEM
M
SEM
t
df
Sig. (2-tailed)
________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

Animate

Category

________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

Statistical Comparison Between Properties for Four-Footed Animals and Furniture Categories for Experiments 1 and 2

Table 1
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Table 2
Animate and Inanimate Sentences Used in Experiments 1 and 2
List 1

List 2

The sofa is pressing against the leather shoe

The sofa is covering the toy football

The rat is breaking the lead pencil

The rat is destroying the wax candle

The sheep is covering the toy football

The sheep is knocking over the aluminum ladder

The bed is scraping the reading glasses

The bed is pressing against the inflated ball

The wolf is holding up the cotton sock

The wolf is bending the steel nail

The dresser is breaking the plastic drum

The dresser is falling onto the smoking pipe

The couch is covering the small clock

The couch is landing on the shiny whistle

The rabbit is landing on the shiny whistle

The rabbit is falling onto the antique vase

The cabinet is bending the steel nail

The cabinet is scraping the dinner fork

The fox is pressing against the inflated ball

The fox is covering the small clock

The stool is falling onto the antique vase

The stool is breaking the lead pencil

The lamp is destroying the wax candle

The lamp is holding up the outside flag

The tiger is bending the metal bell

The tiger is holding up the wooden broom

The mouse is scraping the dinner fork

The mouse is landing on the empty bottle

The chair is knocking over the aluminum ladder

The chair is destroying the cotton sock

The turtle is knocking over the food bowl

The turtle is pressing against the leather shoe

The desk is landing on the empty bottle

The desk is bending the metal bell

The cat is falling onto the smoking pipe

The cat is breaking the plastic drum

The table is holding up the wooden broom

The table is knocking over the food bowl

The bear is destroying the outside flag

The bear is scraping the reading glasses

Inanimate

527 (24.1)
616 (17.8)
599 (18.4)
442 (22.9)

Familiarity

Concreteness

Imageability

Meaningfulness
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4.94

0.37

.086
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575 (32.4)
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52.4 (64.5)
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.409 (.315)
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7.32

15.9
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.100
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16
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18

18
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Relatedness
.311 (.098)
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.293 (.094)
.030
0.40
18
.69
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Frequency

16.4 (15.6)

4.40 (1.17)

Number of Letters
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.259 (.274)

Category Typicality

Dimension
M
SEM
M
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Statistical Comparison Between Properties for Four-Footed Animals and Furniture Categories for Experiment 3

Table 3
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Table 4
Animate and Inanimate Sentences Used for Experiment 3

List 1

List 2

The cat is touching the telephone

The cat is touching the barrel

The dresser is touching the vase

The dresser is touching the umbrella

The couch is touching the bicycle

The couch is touching the clock

The mouse is touching the sled

The mouse is touching the guitar

The lamp is touching the bottle

The lamp is touching the basket

The wolf is touching the football

The wolf is touching the bicycle

The rabbit is touching the shoe

The rabbit is touching the box

The stool is touching the guitar

The stool is touching the telephone

The fox is touching the basket

The fox is touching the broom

The bed is touching the suitcase

The bed is touching is the piano

The sheep is touching the umbrella

The sheep is touching the bottle

The turtle is touching the wagon

The turtle is touching the vase

The table is touching the ladder

The table is touching the wagon

The cabinet is touching the barrel

The cabinet is touching the sled

The rat is touching the clock

The rat is touching the suitcase

The chair is touching the broom

The chair is touching the shoe

The bear is touching the television

The bear is touching the ladder

The desk is touching the box

The desk is touching the football

The tiger is touching the piano

The tiger is touching the flag

The shelf is touching the flag

The shelf is touching the television
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Appendix B

Figure 4. Picture drawings selected from Snodgrass & Vanderwart (1980). Names of
pictures from left to right: ball, bell, bottle, bowl, broom, candle, clock, drum, flag,
football, fork, glasses, ladder, nail, pencil, pipe, shoe, sock, vase, whistle.
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Figure 5. Picture drawings selected from Snodgrass & Vanderwart (1980). Names of
pictures from left to right: barrel, basket, bicycle, bottle, box, broom, clock, flag,
football, guitar, ladder, piano, shoe, sled, suitcase, telephone, television, umbrella,
wagon, vase.

